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Abstract
Prior probabilities represent a core element of the Bayesian probabilistic approach to relatedness testing. This letter
opinions on the commentary Use of prior odds for missing persons identifications by Budowle et al., published
recently in this journal. Contrary to Budowle et al., we argue that the concept of prior probabilities (i) is not
endowed with the notion of objectivity, (ii) is not a case for computation, and (iii) does not require new guidelines
edited by the forensic DNA community–as long as probability is properly considered as an expression of personal
belief.
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’What is the probability that these (unidentified) human
remains are those of this missing person?’ This question
represents a typical example of Bayesian inference: an
initial state of belief, expressed in terms of probabilities
(or, alternatively odds) based on preliminary circumstan-
tial information, can be revised through scientific data–
in particular results of DNA analyses. As noted by
Budowle et al. [1] in their commentary Use of prior odds
for missing persons identifications, a reasoner’s opinion
after the consideration of genetic data is a function of
the initial state of belief, so that there is some interest
in inquiring about its foundations. Budowle et al. [1]
further note that, besides considering the total number
of missing persons, the field has particularly been silent
about how to set initial probabilities. Their conclusion
thus is that ‘[t]he forensic DNA community needs to
develop guidelines for objectively computing prior odds’
[[1], p. 1]. It is on this particular conclusion that we
wish to comment here. In particular, we seek to argue
that by considering a reasoner’s belief state through the
personalist interpretation of probability, the topic of
prior odds (1) does not relate to objectivity, (2) is not a
case for computation, and (3) does not require new
guidelines.
(1) The notion of objectivity is as widely used in scien-
tific communications as it is undefined and, after all,
illusionary [2]. In the particular context of forensic DNA
analyses, Evett and Weir concisely expressed this as fol-
lows:
’(. . .) we do not accept that DNA statistics are
objective in the sense of being independent of
human judgment. In spite of the often elegant math-
ematical arguments we have presented, we stress
that the final statistical values depend wholly on the
initial assumptions. The validity of these assump-
tions in any given case are a matter for expert opi-
nion, so that we claim “objective science” can exist
only within the framework of subjective judgment.’
[[3], p. 217]
Perceived objectivity thus only exists within a frame-
work of intersubjectively accepted assumptions so that,
at best, one may say that ‘[o]bjectivity is merely subjec-
tivity when nearly everyone agrees’ [[4], p. 87]. Here, the
term ‘subjective’ means ‘personal’ because it refers to
the state of belief of an individual reasoner–there is no
suggestion of ‘bias’ or ‘arbitrary’.
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(2) According to the personalist (or belief-type) inter-
pretation, probability is not endowed with any sort of
objective significance that could be seen as a property of
the external world and that exists independently of the
reasoning individual. The idea of ‘computing’, however,
precisely suggests the independent existence of a rule or
procedure that could dictate to reasoners, based on
some aspects of the problem at hand, what ought to be
their initial probabilities. This is exemplified by the
recommendation that, in a case with v victims, along
with an assumption of equiprobability, a reasoner’s prior
probability ought to be 1/v. Although the reasoning
individual is free to choose such a technical and artificial
constraint on a voluntary basis, this amounts to a sub-
jective choice and does in no way represent a necessary
requirement that stems from the theory of probability
[5]. The laws of probability only specify the range of
values that probabilities can take, and how probabilities
are to be combined [6]. More generally, a computational
approach to prior probability assignment is miscon-
ceived because it imposes a technocratic view on a topic
that is actually a case of opinion. Taking a broad view
can help to see this in context, as argued by Lindley
when he wrote that ‘(. . .) the model is your description
of the uncertainty present in your perception of the
situation, the uncertainty expressed in terms of prob-
ability. Thus, the prior is (. . .) part of the model (. . .).
Once the model is settled in this complete form, techni-
que is able to take over; but not until then. Technique
cannot produce an opinion (. . .)’ [[7], p. 184].
(3) If, following Budowle et al., ‘[t]he prior probability
should reflect reasonable beliefs about an event before
receiving new information’ [[1], p. 3]–a viewpoint that
we unreservedly support–then this is a case for the per-
sonalistic approach to probability. Its successful imple-
mentation relies on an awareness among reasoners of
their very own personal opinions, as well as their nature.
A way ahead thus is a genuine understanding of the
concept of probability [8] which, if necessary, appropri-
ate education may favor [9]. A development of guide-
lines, in turn, could amount to or suggest a rigid
application of ‘recipes’ that deprive the decision maker’s
mind of any ductility.
Should the forensic DNA community elaborate on
new guidelines? While we concede that guidelines can
have the merit of expressing ‘intersubjectively’ agreed
suggestions of relevant factors and precautions that
ought to be taken into account in prior probability
assignment, along with a possibly educational compo-
nent, it remains questionable whether scientists should
interfere with a topic of which practicing legal decision
makers are already well aware and that, above all, they
are in a better position to appreciate (e.g., [10]).
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